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Leading from Behind – American Exceptionalism and President Obama’s post-
American Vision of Hegemony 
 
Introduction: Still the 'Indispensable Nation’? 
 
The public invocation of ‘American exceptionalism’ by president Barack Obama to 
legitimize a possible military intervention by the US in Syria on September 10, 2013 
prompted Russia’s president Vladimir Putin to rebuke that very exceptionalism only 
two days later in an op-ed article for the New York Times: 
 
I would rather disagree with a case he made on American exceptionalism, 
stating that the United States’ policy is ‘what makes America different. It’s what 
makes us exceptional.’ It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see 
themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation.1 
 
Gerad Toal on the other hand, writing in Geopolitics in 2009, expressed his hope that 
the American exceptionalism president Obama embodied, -post-modern, globalized, 
inclusive, pragmatic, and cosmopolitan-, could act as a transforming agent to the 
geopolitical culture of the United States, and move the country away from the imperial 
hubris and ideological fixation on ‘ethnocentric provincialism’ that had prevailed under 
George W. Bush.2 Putin in turn clearly found the very idea of American exceptionalism 
unacceptable, because he identified it as the ideational foundation for the global 
hegemony of the United States, and its policy of liberal interventionism.  
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This article argues that a critical examination of contemporary geopolitical discourses in 
the United States can neither fully validate either claim brought forward in context with 
the ‘exceptionalist’ character of the Obama presidency and its effect on US policy. In 
fact, a critical engagement with the discursive performance and political significance of 
American exceptionalism under the Obama presidency suggests that the key features 
discussed in the literature, -the uniqueness of the United States, the belief in the 
superiority of American values, and the preeminence of American power-, have been 
re-appropriated by president Obama.3   
 
Under Obama, American exceptionalism functions as a discursive device that augments 
a largely un-exceptional foreign and security policy that stresses cooperative 
engagement and military restraint, reflecting a ‘post-American’ vision of hegemony.4 
So, a key concept of geopolitical identity construction associated with uniqueness, 
difference and separation is actually linked to a policy course meant to make the United 
States somewhat more like others, not to exclusively stress its hegemonic, unipolar 
position and sole responsibility for world order. This challenges the view, often brought 
forward in the critical literature that the belief in American exceptionalism, the 
‘discourse of distinctness’ in the words of Nayak and Malone, serves primarily to 
underwrite a worldview of American hegemony, and to formulate an activist foreign 
and security policy to re-make the world in America’s image.5  
 
Post-American exceptionalism: a critical reading 
 
Rather than investigating, as the positivist literature does, if the uniqueness of the 
United States can be empirically validated through a study of socio-economic, political, 
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and historical factors, as exemplary executed in the works of Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Deborah Madsen, and others, a critical approach seeks to understand how the belief in 
American exceptionalism, as a key myth of American identity formation, is constituted 
and reconstituted through discourse. 6  However, the critical literature shares an 
important analytical common ground with the former approach in that the research 
primarily focuses on the issue of the construction of uniqueness in the American 
identity performance, and the discourses and narratives that reproduce this 
exceptionalist definition of the American Self.7 As James W. Ceaser has noted on the 
study of the meaning of exceptionalism: “The common denominator is a claim to 
uniqueness, which the investigator may then confirm or deny.”8 
 
‘Only in America,’ Toal for example asserted, would the story of Obama’s mercurial 
rise from outsider, both racially and geographically (an African-American, born on 
Hawaii, and raised in Indonesia) to ‘ultimate insider’ of commander-in-chief have been 
possible.9 Toal’s article outlined in detail Obama’s presidential campaign and election 
as positive example for American exceptionalism, and its promise for a US foreign 
policy of pragmatism and ‘reflexive security,’ contrasted against the negative 
exceptionalism of the Bush administration and its ‘aggressive neoconservative foreign 
policy.’10 Nayak and Malone in turn concluded that next to American orientalism, the 
genealogical prevalence of American exceptionalism was a critical component of 
national identity construction that would help to better understand the ‘continuity and 
endurance of American hegemony.’11  
 
An interpretive reading of the discursive reproduction of a historic-cultural genealogy of 
Puritan republicanism and insular, geographical position, -the claimed singularity of the 
 4 
American experience, from the Massachusetts Bay Colony to Manifest Destiny and the 
American Century-, seeks to critically engage the construction of an American 
geopolitical identity of uniqueness and separation and its political implications. As 
Trevor McCrisken has written in his detailed analysis: “The belief in American 
exceptionalism provides an essential element of the cultural and intellectual framework 
for the making and conduct of US foreign policy.”12 The construct of an exceptional 
American identity in turn is seen as connected primarily to discourses that formulate a 
geopolitical vision of American hegemony, superiority and national mission.13 “(…) 
there has remained a strong belief that the United States is an exceptional nation, not 
only unique but also superior among nations.14 
 
Rather than focusing on the past and contemporary writing and re-writing of American 
uniqueness however, this article is primarily interested in a critical analysis of the 
discursive performance, the political function that American exceptionalism fulfills in 
contemporary US foreign and security policy, and how this reflects back to changes or 
continuities in the dominant geopolitical imagination. Moving beyond the discussion if 
the United States actually constitutes a unique political entity or not, or how the belief 
in American uniqueness is discursively inscribed, allows the article to open up its 
critical research perspective to the issue of the political-functional aspect of American 
exceptionalism as a ‘thick signifier.’ 15  Drawing in part from Jef Huysman’s 
reconceptualization of security, the article thus analyzes the meaning of ‘American 
exceptionalism’ through its relation to other signifiers such as ‘American leadership,’ or 
‘nation-building at home,’ in order to explore how it is politically organized as an 
expression of, and legitimization for US foreign and security policy. As Huysman has 
explained: “(…) one searches for key dimensions of the wider order of meaning within 
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which the framework itself is embedded.”16 Hence it is the political performance rather 
than the identity building function of American exceptionalism that provides the focus 
of a critical engagement with the subject. 
 
Here, a critical discourse analysis reveals that as articulated by president Obama, 
American exceptionalism is a construct of geopolitical identity that draws both from the 
materiality of the superior power base of the United States, -economically as well as 
militarily-, and ideationally from the belief in the superiority of American values of 
freedom and liberty. This fusion of hegemonic identity and superior power in the 
discourse of American exceptionalism under Obama however, does neither constitute 
the United States as a ‘shining city upon a hill,’ as president Reagan did, nor as a 
crusading superpower, or ‘colossus,’ which embraces its ‘unipolar moment.’17 As such, 
Obama’s definition of American exceptionalism does not align directly with either of 
the two main strands McCrisken for example has identified in terms of influencing 
American foreign policy: Here, American exceptionalism politically manifests either as 
course of restraint of an ‘exemplar nation,’ and isolationist ‘Fortress America,’ or, as 
has been dominant at least since World War 2, as liberal, imperialist mission of the 
‘leader of the free world.’18   
 
Instead, we encounter a post-American exceptionalism where Obama attempts to 
recalibrate the American identity of unique superiority and global responsibility toward 
a grand strategy of engagement, ‘burden-sharing,’ and ‘leading from behind’ that aligns 
the United States closer with others, and engages it less direct militarily. This 
contradictory fusion of an hegemonic identity of American exceptionalism with a US 
foreign and security policy that anticipates, but has not yet fully arrived in a post-
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American, post-hegemonic international system, marks the political significance and 
interpretive value of American exceptionalism under the Obama presidency. Thus, the 
article offers a critical reinterpretation of American exceptionalism as ideational 
foundation for US policy that questions the discursive linkage of ideational uniqueness 
and geopolitical hegemony.  
 
President Obama and the production of American exceptionalism as geopolitical 
discourse  
 
Despite their obvious differences in the treatment of the subject, both the texts by Toal 
and Putin demonstrated how expressions of American exceptionalism are fundamentally 
tied to a geopolitical vision of American leadership in the world, and the role the US 
president plays in articulating this vision. President Obama as head of state and 
government embodies, and at the same time articulates the American claim to 
leadership in world politics. As Ó Tuathail and Agnew have remarked, the US president 
plays a special role in American geopolitical discourse. “He is the chief bricoleur of 
American political life, a combination of storyteller and tribal shaman.”19 In this 
institutional role the president has the ability to frame the national narrative, and 
potentially recalibrate the articulation of geopolitical identity, if the Presidential 
discourse is reinforced and reconfirmed by sufficient levels of intertextual connectivity 
and finds recognition in popular, formal and practical discourses.20  
 
In its critical analysis, the article operates from a Foucauldian understanding of 
discourse as dominant definition of social reality through the nexus of 
power/knowledge that is manifest in both representations and practices. In fact, the 
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article suggests that it is the discursive interplay of the representation of the ideational 
character of America as ‘exceptional,’ and the political confirmation or contestation of 
this identity through the practice of US foreign and security policy, -most importantly in 
the form of military intervention-, that the former attains its political significance.21 
Thus, it is the representations and practices the president of the United States employs 
to define the geopolitical identity of the United States and to orient US foreign and 
security policy that are a crucial in understanding the mutual implication of identity and 
politics in geopolitical discourse.   
 
A critical analysis should thus move beyond the emphasis on distinctiveness that tends 
to reproduce the American exceptionalism discourse as one of two extremes: missionary 
or exemplary, crusading or isolationist, active or passive. A critical examination should 
instead approach the wider geopolitical contextualization of American exceptionalism, 
and how it can be used as a useful lens of interpretation for the trajectory of US foreign 
policy, the continuity, or change of dominant concepts of geopolitical imagination, and 
the formulation and reformulation of American leadership and US policies among 
shifting perceptions of identity and power in the international system. Under Obama, 
both the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council of the 
United States for example have released official documents stressing the changing 
parameters for American leadership in an increasingly multipolar international system.22  
 
In terms of content, the exchange between president Obama and his Republican 
challenger Mitt Romney about the nature of American exceptionalism during the 
presidential campaign of 2012, offers a valuable opportunity to analyze the link between 
exceptionalist rhetoric and diverging visions of American leadership and US foreign 
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and security policy that underlined the contested nature of American hegemony under 
Obama. Obama’s conflicted reformulation of American leadership, between an 
acknowledgement of American exceptionalism, and a US foreign and security policy 
that seeks rather less than more engagement and military commitment has also been on 
display on Libya, where America led ‘from behind,’ the original non-intervention 
against the Assad regime in Syria, and more recently in the caveated response against 
Russian actions in Ukraine, and the advance of ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, where 
Obama categorically ruled out the presence of ‘boots on the ground.’ However, Obama 
is unable to resolve the fundamental contradiction entailed in his course of post-
American exceptionalism, as the severe criticism of his handling of the Syria crisis, and 
sinking approval ratings on foreign policy have demonstrated.  
 
President Obama frames the exceptionalism of America, as he defines it, its outstanding 
military and economic power, and centrally its constitutionally enshrined values of 
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law primarily as unique opportunity of the United 
States to shape the international environment through a grand strategy of cooperative 
engagement. Under president Obama, American exceptionalism is thus being redefined 
to operate within a more cooperative, less military power centric approach to world 
politics. This reflects a world in which the Unites States is likely to remain the most 
powerful, but not the sole dominating actor in international affairs. Accordingly, 
Obama’s foreign policy oscillates between traditionally liberal, internationalist goals, 
and realist power calculations of US involvement. Under Obama then, the discursive 
interlinkage of American exceptionalism and American hegemony reveals a 
contradiction rather than confirmation of American separation and uniqueness, both 
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ideationally and politically. It is an American exceptionalism for the post-American 
century. 
 
American Exceptionalism and American Leadership: The hegemonic Imagination 
of the United States in World Politics 
 
One of most powerful and enduring of America's national myths is the belief that 
America is different from the rest of the world.23 American exceptionalism provides a 
key component for the geopolitical imagination of the United States and the articulation 
of the country’s identity in world politics. The conventional definition of American 
exceptionalism states that a special and unique set of social, political and economic 
features elevates the historical development of the United States above and beyond that 
of other nations. Frequently, a historic imagination of the United States as ‘new’ entity 
in world politics, and its ‘unique’ political origin are brought forward to construct an 
exceptionalist genealogy of the United States from the first Puritan settlements and the 
American Revolution all the way to the present day.24 Fabian Hilfrich for example notes 
that: “Enlightenment thought and the American Revolution completed the secularization 
of exceptionalism by postulating that the democratic foundations of the United States 
were the distinguishing features of its uniqueness.”25  
 
In this reading, American exceptionalism is the ultimate expression of the difference of 
the United States and its political, social and economic otherness. The uniqueness and 
superiority of capabilities in turn, in particular in the military realm, and the ability of 
the United States to control the ‘global commons’ of sea, air and cyber space is seen as 
the ultimate definition of US hegemony, or primacy.26 Stephen Brooks for example 
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identifies the ongoing global military preeminence of the United States as the most 
visible proof that American exceptionalism under president Obama is still a reality: 
“(…) one would still be justified in speaking of American exceptionalism on the basis 
of its military capabilities alone.”27 As Simon Dalby has noted: “Geopolitics is about 
the political organization of space, and about how this is conceived, represented and 
used in political discussion.” 28  The ability for global power projection and the 
reorganization of political space through military force, and its linkage to a key concept 
American national identity underlines how exceptionalism and hegemony reproduce 
each other discursively as defining feature of American geopolitics. The uniqueness of 
identity and the superiority of power become virtually indistinguishable in a 
geopolitical imagination that equals American exceptionalism and American leadership. 
At the same time, the core ‘American’ values of freedom, individualism, democracy, 
the rule of law, and a free-market society are understood by Americans as a universal 
formula for peace and prosperity that ideally all mankind should adopt.29 Seymour 
Martin Lipset for example relates the enduring myth of American exceptionalism to the 
American creed of liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire.30  
 
This missionary element and conviction in the singularity and superiority of America’s 
greatness and its universal values in the exceptionalism myth have often been invoked 
in the past to provide a reasoning for the hegemonic role and dominant place of the 
United States in world politics, in particular since the end of the Cold War. Neo-
conservative thinkers like Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan and William Kristol 
spoke of ‘benevolent hegemony,’ or the ‘unipolar moment’ in order to define the 
newfound singular and superior US role in world politics.31 However, this belief in 
American exceptionalism really represented a bi-partisan consensus in the desirability, 
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efficacy and moral righteousness of global US leadership. 32  Madeline Albright 
famously expressed this conviction in the virtue of American exceptionalism in front of 
the background of military strikes against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1998: 
 
If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable 
nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future than other countries, and we 
see the danger here to all of us.33 
 
In 1995, the National Security Strategy of president Bill Clinton stated: “Never has 
American leadership been more essential — to navigate the shoals of the world's new 
dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities.”34 Under his successor George W. Bush, 
America’s ambition for global leadership and the promotion of its exceptionalist, 
universalist values was articulated as an expansive geopolitical agenda for the spread of 
freedom and democracy:   
 
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements 
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in our world. […] The United States must defend liberty and justice 
because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.35  
 
American exceptionalism as a representation of American distinctiveness, separation 
and superiority had been translated into a geopolitical vision of American primacy and 
preemptive warfare. 36  While accentuated differently between Clinton’s liberal 
interventionism and the unilateral primacy of the Bush administration, this fundamental 
belief in America’s exceptional leadership role in the world, based on its unique values 
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and the unique resources at its disposal, most notably the country’s unparalleled global 
military supremacy, would centrally inform the foreign policy discourse in the twenty 
years between 1989 and the election of president Obama in 2009.  
 
However, with the onset of the global financial crisis, the difficulties of the United 
States in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mounting domestic challenges from 
providing affordable healthcare to public indebtedness, the equation of American 
exceptionalism and American global leadership has come under scrutiny. Increasingly, 
the question seems to be if America can still afford to be the ‘indispensable nation,’ and 
if its exceptionalism automatically means that the United States must act as ‘policeman 
of the world.’ Prominent critics of US hegemony in international relations have 
postulated that Americans should disentangle their belief in the nation’s exceptionalism 
from a conviction in the wisdom of global military primacy and interventionism.37 In 
the words of Andrew Bacevich for example, the United States should ‘exemplify’ and 
‘illuminate’ the world through its ‘self-mastery’ instead of trying to ‘compel’ and 
‘enforce’ others.38 Prominent Realist IR scholars like Stephen Walt suggest the United 
States should pursue a grand strategy of ‘offshore balancing’ and remove its forward 
presence of permanently stationed troops from Asia and Europe. 39  As Walt has 
explained:  “U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were 
less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.”40 
 
Some conservatives, especially in the libertarian Tea Party wing of the Republican Party 
share this view of a more limited role of the United States in world affairs. Senator 
Rand Paul for example is a prominent proponent of ‘non interventionism.’41 This policy 
would drastically reduce military expenditures, liquidate the overseas empire of US 
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bases, and avoid armed interventions at all cost. This passive exceptionalism however, 
which would seek to preserve the perceived uniqueness of the United States through a 
policy of disengagement from the world is still a minority position at the fringes of US 
foreign policy discourse. It is frequently associated with the stigma of isolationism of 
the 1930s, and partially seen as outright ‘un-American.’42 Indeed, it was president 
Obama’s alleged weakening of America’s outstanding power and its exceptional status 
that provoked some of the most severe criticism of his administration. Yet, while 
president Obama emphasized American exceptionalism in a way that seemed to 
repudiate Republican ideas of American leadership, this did not happen as an 
ideological confrontation of active, missionary primacy versus passive, exemplary 
isolationism, but rather as an alternative formulation of American leadership.  
 
No Apology: Obama, American Exceptionalism and the contested Vision of US 
Hegemony in domestic Politics  
 
Asked by a European reporter in 2009 at a NATO summit press conference in 
Strasbourg if he believed in American exceptionalism, president Obama stated that he 
believed in it, like the British would believe in British exceptionalism, or the Greeks in 
Greek exceptionalism.43 This remains quite a remarkable contextualizing statement 
from an incumbent US president about the uniqueness of the identity of the United 
States in world politics. Subsequently, it was widely reported in the media, and drew 
heavy criticism from Republican circles. However, and often overlooked, it was in the 
same statement that president Obama also declared that the United States was 
‘objectively’ exceptional in several ways:  
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(…) the United States remains the largest economy in the world. We have 
unmatched military capability. We have a core set of values that are enshrined in 
our Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in 
free speech and equality, that, though imperfect, are exceptional (…).44 
 
Where president Obama did deviate from the established exceptionalist consensus of the 
1990s and 2000s was that he did not unanimously endorse American exceptionalism as 
vision of American global primacy and unipolarity: 
 
I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued 
extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and 
recognizing that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create 
partnerships because we can’t solve these problems alone.45 
 
Instead of focusing exclusively on the sole status of the United States as ‘indispensable 
nation,’ and its unique superiority of power and the singularity of its values, Obama 
argued for an exceptionalism of America’s role in the world that acknowledged the 
unique potential the US had in establishing cooperation with others in order to achieve 
global outcomes. 46  This went directly against the Jacksonian unilateralism that 
dominates foreign policy views in large parts of the Republican Party and the strong 
emphasis on outstanding military power that began under Ronald Reagan.47 Here 
American exceptionalism stands symbolically for an unapologetic support of American 
primacy, military preeminence, and unilateral assertiveness. The Republican discourse 
also strongly associates exceptionalism with the belief in a new ‘American century’ and 
the rejection of any notion of even relative decline. American exceptionalism had thus 
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become a contested issue in domestic American politics. It was a contest about which 
geopolitical vision of leadership should guide the nation into the future: president 
Obama’s approach of cooperative engagement, or the Republican vision of American 
primacy.  
 
During the presidential campaign of 2012, American exceptionalism then fully emerged 
as a major foreign and security policy issue on the public scene, between president 
Obama and his Republican contender Mitt Romney. Romney, who had publicly 
declared to be a firm believer in American exceptionalism, repeatedly criticized Obama 
for ‘apologizing for American values’.48 President Obama’s approach to international 
relations and foreign policy was seen as deeply flawed by conservative critics because it 
was supposedly not rooted in the belief in American exceptionalism and singular 
leadership, but motivated by a negative view of the international role the United States 
had played in the past. A president, who frequently stressed international cooperation 
and multilateral approaches to global governance, and who had distanced himself from 
the unilateralism associated with the previous Bush administration, was criticized for 
going on an alleged ‘apology tour’ around the world, when he first came to office.49 In 
his bestselling book, titled No Apology, the Republican Presidential candidate had thus 
explained: 
 
I reject the view that America must decline. I believe in American 
exceptionalism. I am convinced that we can act together to strengthen the nation, 
to preserve our global leadership, and to protect freedom where it exists and 
promote it where it does not.50 
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Romney’s vociferous confirmation of American exceptionalism actually reiterated a 
neoconservative vision of global leadership, based on America’s military capability for 
global power projection, including regime change in so called ‘rogue states’.51 This was 
not surprising, given that the chief advisor on foreign affairs for Romney’s campaign 
was Robert Kagan, a major neoconservative scholar, who remained a staunch advocate 
of US hegemony and unipolarity as only guarantee for the survival of the liberal world 
order, and thus for the maintenance of great power peace, the spread of democracy, and 
economic prosperity. 52  For president Obama’s conservative critics, American 
exceptionalism represents an item of faith, defining America’s national greatness, and 
the ideational foundation that should animate the country’s expansive grand strategy of 
unapologetic American leadership. A policy that was seen as moving away from US 
hegemony therefore appeared as antithesis to American exceptionalism.  
 
Fears that president Obama, due to his ‘exotic’ upbringing, multicultural background, 
and ideological disposition, was somehow ‘un-American,’ were frequently raised on the 
American Right, and were especially pronounced during the Presidential campaign of 
2012.53 Beyond a mere dispute about politics, the foreign and security policy of 
president Obama was scrutinized for being anti-exceptional, and therefore anti-
American by its very design.  
 
President Obama and American Exceptionalism in a post-American World: 
Leading through Engagement  
 
In contrast to the exceptionalist vision of American primacy favored by the Republican 
establishment, the foreign and security policy of president Obama seems in many ways 
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influenced by what Fareed Zakaria dubbed, the ‘post-American world.’ In this scenario 
the ‘rise of the rest’ is perceived to shift the global geopolitical balance of power into an 
increasingly multipolar order, while the United States is expected to remain the most 
powerful and influential player in global affairs for the foreseeable future. This 
transformation is reflected in the way Obama defined American exceptionalism and 
utilized it to orient US foreign policy. It is an exceptionalism for an increasingly 
complex and interdependent world in which the meaning of global leadership is less 
defined by imposing one’s will on a political opponent, and more associated with 
organizing working international relationships on issues from climate change to trade 
agreements. As Zakaria would formulate back in 2008: “At a military-political level, 
America still dominates the world, but the larger structure of unipolarity -economic, 
financial, cultural- is weakening.54  
 
Here, more countries than ever before have a say in global governance, and require 
attention, respect and understanding. As president Obama has remarked during a G-20 
summit in London, the world has changed: “If it’s just Roosevelt and Churchill sitting 
in a room with brandy, […] that’s an easier negotiation. But that’s not the world we live 
in.”55 In fact, this assessment of a geopolitical rebalancing has already entered official 
policy documents, such as the Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: “(…) the 
United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key 
allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.”56 It is also a regular feature in 
the US National Intelligence Council’s long-term grand strategy forecasts, where a 
‘global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others.’57 
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While tacitly acknowledging these post-American dynamics, Obama has frequently 
maintained a commitment to America’s global leadership and military preeminence, for 
example in his State of the Union Address in 2012 when he proclaimed: “(…) America 
remains the one indispensable nation in world affairs – and as long as I’m president, I 
intend to keep it that way.”58 Here, the president invoked the famous exceptionalist 
description of the singular, hegemonic role of the United States in world politics that 
had been used by Albright and Clinton during the 1990s. The global financial crisis and 
the debate about American decline have apparently also not fundamentally discredited 
the idea of American exceptionalism, or displaced it as a powerful myth about 
America’s role in the world. In a 2011 Pew research poll, nine out of ten Americans, 
across party lines, said the United States either stood above all other countries in the 
world (38%) or was one of the greatest along with some others (53%).59  
 
At his second inaugural address in 2013 Obama also again referred to the exceptional 
identity of the United States, directly quoting from the Declaration of Independence and 
thus directly connecting to the historic genealogy of American exceptionalism: 
 
What makes us exceptional -- what makes us American -- is our allegiance to an 
idea, articulated in a declaration made more than two centuries ago: ‘We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’60   
 
Finally, in his much-anticipated declaration of the ‘Obama doctrine’ at West Point on 
May 28, 2014, the president explained that: “I believe in American exceptionalism with 
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every fiber of my being.”61 However, and in a marked departure from the previous Bush 
administration, Obama at the same time initiated a profound rhetoric shift away from 
the pairing of exceptionalism and a dominant focus on the singularity of American 
leadership, the preeminence of military power and the Global War on Terror. This was 
still the lens through which the former president had seen America’s role in the world, a 
country shaped by what Bush called the ‘defining ideological struggle of the 21st 
century’.62 Where Bush envisioned the United States committed in an open-ended 
confrontation against extremists, which ‘despise freedom’ and ‘despise America’, 
Obama frequently invoked the picture of  ‘turning the page after a decade of war.’63 
 
A central point in Obama’s speeches and statements was that the United States was 
strongest, when it could lead through the power of its example, not alone the example of 
its power. “Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our 
power -– it must also be the purpose behind it.”64 This key theme also entered the text 
of the National Security Strategy of 2010: “Our moral leadership is grounded 
principally in the power of our example—not through an effort to impose our system on 
other peoples.”65 At West Point Obama declared: “(…) what makes us exceptional is 
not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of law; it is our willingness to 
affirm them through our actions.”66 
 
In essence, president Obama connects a belief in the exceptionalism of the United States 
and its ‘unique’ strengths and values with a careful appreciation for the scope and 
limitations of US power. The latter, according to Obama, required the integration of the 
United States in a cooperative, international order, and the sharing of costs, both 
economically and militarily, with allies and partners. Thus, Obama’s definition of 
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American exceptionalism and its discursive linkage to US policy reveals a paradox 
between the ideal of American uniqueness and singularity, and the practical requirement 
of greater engagement, and a less exposed, less hegemonic American role in world 
politics.  
 
Leading from Behind in Libya 
 
The military intervention in Libya saw the United States act in a way that corresponded 
to the reframing president Obama undertook in orienting the country’s geopolitical 
identity. While still ‘exceptionally’ powerful and acting in defense of its ‘unique’ 
values, Obama’s America did not seek the spotlight in directing a new campaign against 
yet another dictator in the Middle East. Rather, it sought to exercise its leadership role 
in a more limited fashion, and operate primarily through allies and partners. In arguing 
for America’s involvement in Libya the president again linked American 
exceptionalism and American leadership: 
 
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and — more profoundly — 
our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would 
have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind 
eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.67 
 
While its unique and superior military assets were providing the opening round of 
strikes against the Gaddafi regime, and the support of the United States was decisive in 
securing a vote sanctioning the intervention by the UN Security Council, the United 
States soon withdraw and let others, notably France and the United Kingdom take the 
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lead in operating militarily against Gaddafi. This new, more cooperative, and at the 
same time more limited and restrained approach would become famous as ‘leading from 
behind.’ The term is attributed to an unknown member of the Obama administration, 
and it found a wide media echo, in particular after it featured prominently in an article 
by the New Yorker.68  
 
The public and expert reaction to ‘leading from behind’ was so strong, because the term 
seemed to encapsulate a new geopolitical vision, a new way the United States exercised 
its power, and understood its hegemonic position in world politics. As Ryan Lizza, the 
author of the New Yorker article put it: “(…) at the heart of the idea of leading from 
behind is the empowerment of other actors to do your bidding (…).”69At the same time, 
the advisor who coined the phrase admitted: “It’s so at odds with the John Wayne 
expectation for what America is in the world.”70 
 
In his cover letter to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, Obama would refer to the 
Libya campaign, and the ‘growing capabilities of allies and partners’ to illustrate his 
vision of ‘burden-sharing.’ 71  To Republicans however, ‘leading from behind’ 
represented further proof that Obama’s vision consisted of diminishing US power in the 
world, and to accept American decline.72 George Bush had formulated a vision of 
American exceptionalism as an unquestionable global leadership role of the US in an 
expansive agenda for global transformation through overwhelming military force in the 
Global War on Terror. Obama’s ‘leading from behind’ appeared as remarkable 
reformulation of American exceptionalism and US hegemony that incorporated the 
professed uniqueness of American power and values into a cooperative context of 
‘limited engagement.’  
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Obama’s policy of letting allies and partners do the military heavy-lifting on Libya was 
also the result of a new awareness in the United States concerning the cost of military 
intervention, in both blood and treasure. As the Washington Post wrote on March 4, 
2014: 
In Washington, among policymakers, the Afghan war is increasingly discussed 
with exasperation, like a curse. It is the type of warfare the United States must 
avoid at all cost, president Obama argued during his State of the Union 
address.73 
 
One of the primary concerns of the Obama administration was to avoid further military 
entanglements of the kind of the Iraq occupation and the counter-insurgency operations 
undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of thousands of American 
servicemen and -women and cost billions of US$. Congressionally mandated 
sequestration, a policy move officially opposed by Obama, and its impact on defense 
spending would further limit the willingness and capabilities of the administration to 
undertake large-scale ground operations. As part of the Pentagon budget proposal for 
2015, Chuck Hagel announced further cuts to the American Armed Forces, bringing the 
U.S. Army down to its ‘smallest number of troops since before the Second World War,’ 
as it was widely reported.74 Instead, low-cost drone strikes and small-scale covert 
special operations would become the hallmark of counter-terrorism policy under 
Obama, demonstrating a new ‘light footprint’ approach of American hegemony.75  
 
On Libya, the discursive re-framing Obama applied to the world political role of the 
United States was matched to a new material reality of less exposed U.S. assets, and 
greater constraints on the use of military power, in order to save money. Was this 
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process primarily driven by a classical realist cost-benefit analysis? It is possible, 
however given the contextualization of American foreign and security policy, both 
before and after the Libya intervention, it seems more likely that Obama appropriated 
the argument of risk and cost to further augment a strategic course of limited 
engagement and restraint that he had advocated early on, long before the Pentagon 
entered its ‘age of austerity,’ and which continues to shape his policy choices. If US 
policy were exclusively driven by the impulse to save cost and minimize exposure 
however, Obama, despite some political risk both at home and abroad, could have 
simply ruled out military intervention. Such a realist ‘off-shore’ balancing approach 
however does not actually match Obama’s vision of hegemony. Against Gaddafi 
America may have led from behind, but it did not stay home.  
 
While probably not the sole drivers of U.S. policy under Obama then, both the 
technology of remote drone strikes, and an era of defense budget cuts fall in line with an 
America that seeks to reframe, but not relinquish its global leadership role. Viewed 
from a critical perspective, the practice of military intervention, and the technological 
and economic parameters of American power are not separate, non-discursive entities, 
but reinforce existing discourses that in turn provide the rational for limited U.S. action, 
as for example over Syria. Obama has embraced rather than opposed these changes to 
America’s military posture and national security, yet he failed to embed them in a 
convincing narrative about America’s leadership role in the world. 
 
Still, this approach of limited engagement seems remarkably realist, coming from a 
Democratic President. The actual sharing of responsibilities appears to be much less 
informed by traditional, liberal concepts of collective security arrangements, and more 
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in line with the idea of ‘coalitions of the willing,’ whose purpose is first and foremost to 
serve the interests of the United States, in this case for regional security and cost-
saving.76  
 
In his liberal analysis of Obama’ foreign policy, Timothy Lynch alluded to this tension, 
when he characterized Obama as a liberal, closer to Reagan, who was in pursuit of a 
‘minimalist strategy’ to remake the world. 77 The contradictory fusion of realist restraint 
and liberal engagement was well on display on Libya, where Obama directed a military 
campaign that seemed in equal parts focused on the promotion of American values, and 
the limitation of U.S. involvement. Neither applying liberal institutionalism, nor realism 
can then fully account for the conduct of the Libya intervention. It is precisely this 
contradictory fusion of competing foreign policy traditions in Obama’s definition of 
American exceptionalism that makes the exercise of American leadership under his 
presidency so controversial, and equally disappointing to humanitarian interventionists, 
neoconservative hawks and long-term critics of American primacy. However, as the 
Syria episode would demonstrate, any reframing of American exceptionalism and 
difference would still have to occur within the established geopolitical imagination of 
American leadership and could not successfully be brought in line with a political 
practice that would fail to document the exercise of US hegemony and military power.  
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American Exceptionalism and Syria: Team America no longer wants to be the 
World’s Police  
 
There seems to exist a general weariness in the United States about the country’s global 
commitments, disillusionment with military interventions and their political outcomes, 
and a heightened awareness for the complexity of world politics in the 21st century. As 
one newspaper article headline put it: “Team America no longer wants to be the 
World’s Police.”78 A much reported Pew research poll of 2014 found that 52% of 
Americans said the US should ‘mind its own business internationally and let other 
countries get along the best they can on their own’ — the first time since 1964 than 
more than half the public held that view.79 
 
The president acknowledged this national fatigue, when he directly quoted from a 
veteran’s letter addressed to him, during his nationally televised address on Syria in 
2013: “This nation is sick and tired of war.”80 But while in this speech Obama 
reemphasized his focus to end America’s wars, not to start new ones, and to focus on 
rebuilding the nation at home, he did invoke the image of American exceptionalism as a 
special responsibility for the United States to act when its unique values where violated, 
as with the gas attacks attributed to the Assad regime in Syria. On the other hand, the 
president went to great lengths to distinguish a possible military intervention in Syria 
from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, from the beginning ruling out the possibilities of 
ground invasion, regime change, or even a prolonged air campaign like in Kosovo, or 
Libya. This caveated, limited and cautious link between exceptionalism and US policy 
that Obama demonstrated in his speech was then effectively severed by the fact that he 
postponed seeking an authorization for military strikes from Congress, a vote he was 
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likely to have lost, and instead opted for a diplomatic solution in accordance with 
Russia. President Obama closed his remarks on Syria with the following: 
 
America is not the world’s policeman. Terrible things happen across the globe, 
and it is beyond our means to right every wrong. But when, with modest effort 
and risk, we can stop children from being gassed to death, […], I believe we 
should act. That’s what makes America different. That’s what makes us 
exceptional. With humility, but with resolve, let us never lose sight of that 
essential truth.81 
 
The image of American exceptionalism in Obama’s speech implied a special 
responsibility of the United States to commit its outstanding military assets when its 
unique values where violated, however a policy that would demonstrate this exceptional 
responsibility failed to materialize. While president Obama has worked towards 
redefining American exceptionalism along the lines of engagement and multilateral 
cooperation, it remains an image that is fundamentally tied to an image of American 
leadership through military preeminence. On Libya, Obama could reconcile this tension, 
encapsulated in the phrase ‘leading from behind.’82  
 
On Syria however, the president could not provide an image of determined leadership. 
The implied consequences for crossing the ‘red lines’ Obama set up, did not result in 
military action by the United States, and ‘red lines’ has become a symbol for the 
perceived weakness of the United States under Obama among conservative critics, 
foreign policy experts, and the media.83 And even though a majority of Americans 
favored a diplomatic solution in Syria, the dominant impression was that Obama and the 
 27 
United States had been diplomatically outmaneuvered by Putin.84 A CBS/New York 
Times poll, released on 25 September 2013, revealed that just 37 percent approved of 
president Obama’s handling of the Syrian crisis. His general approval ratings on foreign 
policy also dropped significantly over the course of the Syria episode.85 This indicates 
that any redefinition of American exceptionalism in the context of current US foreign 
policy has its limits. As Kagan has remarked in the Washington Post, while according to 
polls Americans in general favor a focus on ‘nation building at home’ and ‘leading from 
behind,’ the geopolitical image of exceptionalism, leadership and indispensability has 
also been a source of national pride and self-confirmation: “To follow a leader to 
triumph inspires loyalty, gratitude and affection. Following a leader in retreat inspires 
no such emotions.”86 It seems that while the image of American exceptionalism can be 
instrumentalized to define a style of American leadership that shares responsibilities 
with others, rather than only relying on the United States to act as the ‘indispensable 
nation’, it cannot be reconciled with a perceived absence of leadership.  
 
Ukraine and ISIS: American exceptionalism reconfirmed? 
 
Recent US actions in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the advance of 
the ISIS terror organization in Iraq and Syria seem to suggest a reconfirmation of 
American exceptionalism and a more forceful American leadership role under Obama. 
In response to the Ukraine crisis Obama has pledged 1 billion US dollars for a military 
program of reinforcements in Europe, and about 500 American troops each have been 
sent to Poland and the three Baltic states on a rotational basis.87 Against ISIS, the 
United States has forged an international coalition with Arab and European 
participation, and launched a military campaign of airstrikes and assistance to Kurdish 
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groups.88 However, at closer examination both cases actually reveal the conflicted 
leadership role of the US under Obama that lacks a clear confirmation of American 
exceptionalism as geopolitical vision of hegemony and military supremacy.    
 
On Ukraine for example, president Obama, although hailing a ‘unified response’ led by 
the United States has largely taken a backseat diplomatically, and let the German 
chancellor Angela Merkel act as main interlocutor of the West, who negotiated most 
frequently directly with Vladimir Putin.89 Beyond economic sanctions Obama did also 
not seek an escalation of confrontation with Putin’s Russia; there was no suspension of 
the NATO-Russia act of 1997, nor was there substantial US shipments of armaments in 
support of Ukrainian forces fighting pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. And as 
the White House declared, the reassurance of America’s Eastern European NATO allies 
would not ‘come at the expense of other defence priorities, such as our commitment to 
the Asia Pacific rebalance.’90 
 
On ISIS, Obama has categorically and repeatedly rule out the possibility for American 
‘boots on the ground.’91 The US military strategy against the Islamist fighters has so far 
been limited to air strikes, and weapons shipments and training for the Iraqi army, and 
Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria. In the speech announcing the new campaign against 
ISIS, Obama again reiterated the belief in American exceptionalism and the resulting 
claim to world leadership: 
 
America, our endless blessings bestow an enduring burden. But as Americans, 
we welcome our responsibility to lead. From Europe to Asia, from the far 
reaches of Africa to war-torn capitals of the Middle East, we stand for freedom, 
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for justice, for dignity. These are values that have guided our nation since its 
founding.92  
 
At the same time, Obama would demonstrate the discursive link of American 
exceptionalism and a grand strategy of cooperative engagement, which positioned the 
leadership role of the United States in a way that stressed both its global commitment, 
and its greater military restraint and reliance on others: 
 
“(…) this is not our fight alone. American power can make a decisive difference, 
but we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves, nor can we take 
the place of Arab partners in securing their region.”93  
 
As with the Libya intervention, it seems that Obama’s stand is in equal parts motivated 
by limiting American involvement and by fighting ISIS and promoting US security 
interests. America’s actions then are not the product of a coherent ‘strategy,’ one which 
Obama at first admitted he did not even have, but testament to an unresolved tension of 
having to promote America’s ‘unique’ liberal values through limited means. The 
geopolitical vision of American leadership Obama presents, and that he frequently 
connects to the uniqueness and superiority of the United States materializes in a policy 
course that acknowledges the limits of US power, rather than the exceptional potential 
to remake the world in America’s image.  
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Conclusion 
 
Obama’s skepticism about the efficacy and desirability of military interventions and 
regime change, his emphasis on ‘nation-building at home’, the now famous ‘leading 
from behind’ approach of his administration in the Libya intervention of 2011, and the 
president’s own statements on the subject, all raise the question, if American 
exceptionalism functions as a key ideological concept that underlies a ‘missionary’ US 
foreign and security policy and expansive, imperial agenda. At the same time, the use of 
exceptionalist rhetoric in the Syria episode, or the military intervention against ISIS do 
not suggest that the United States has entered a phase of neo-isolationism, or that the 
president is trying to redefine the country’s exceptional identity towards a passive 21st 
century version of the ‘shining city upon a hill.’  
 
President Obama does not associate ‘American exceptionalism,’ the belief in the 
distinctiveness and singularity of the United States with a vision of unilateral military 
primacy, global interventionism and unipolar hegemony, as Putin implied. This 
hegemonic, exceptionalist vision however is still very much en vogue with large parts 
of the Republican Party and influential neoconservatives, as the Romney presidential 
campaign has demonstrated. There is an unbroken belief in the establishment of the 
Republican Party in the ‘missionary’ strand of American exceptionalism and the 
prospect of yet another American century. As the Romney-Obama debate demonstrated 
however, the political meaning of American exceptionalism is not limited to an 
exchange of missionary versus exemplary exceptionalism, between the crusading 
superpower and the ‘shining city upon a hill’ that seeks to merely illuminate the world. 
Instead, American exceptionalism acquires its meaning in contemporary geopolitics as 
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an expression of the hegemonic imagination of the United States that fuses the 
superiority of material power with the uniqueness of identity. 
 
Investigating American exceptionalism in the context of a dominant geopolitical vision 
of American leadership reveals how this key concept of identity construction is bound 
up with the practice of US foreign and security policy and the discourse of the country’s 
grand strategy. Rather than engaging in debates about American separation and 
uniqueness that only serve to reproduce the discursive trap of exceptionalism, it is the 
question how the United States uses the geopolitical imagination of American 
exceptionalism in defining its leadership role that makes the concept a phenomenon of 
political significance. Such an understanding could prove a fruitful reconceptualization 
for critical investigations into a subject that has become something of a cliché in the 
literature, and renew the interest in the explanatory value of American exceptionalism 
beyond a reproduction of its Puritan-republican genealogy and repetitive debates of 
isolationism versus primacy.  
 
Further research should be undertaken to contextualize Obama’s post-American 
definition of American exceptionalism with previous US presidents and their definition 
of American world leadership. Jimmy Carter’s ‘malaise speech,’ George H. Bush’s 
problem with the ‘vision thing,’ and Bill Clinton’s liberal vision of globalization and 
engagement all produced various charges against a lack of leadership and the failure to 
formulate grand strategy. Comparing Obama’s stand to past presidents would further 
serve to probe the validity of the primacy vs. isolationism narrative in the analysis of 
American exceptionalism, and to examine the uniqueness of his post-American 
approach. Looking forward, it will be fascinating to observe if the next president of the 
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United States, be it Republican or Democrat, will continue on the trajectory Obama has 
set, or if there will be a reconfirmation of American exceptionalism and primacy in 
rejection of Obama, similar to Obama’s rejection of George W. Bush. This will also 
help to determine if Obama’s vision of America’s role in the world was primarily a 
matter of personal conviction, as charged by his Republican critics, or what seems more 
likely, a reflection of a broader shift in geopolitical trends that will continue to inform 
US policy in the future.   
 
Obama’s geopolitical vision does not mean that the United States has forsaken its claim 
to American leadership in world politics altogether, or that it no longer employs the 
tools of American primacy. The escalation of American drone strikes in the Middle 
East, and the latest attacks on ISIS have demonstrated how Obama’s reformulation of 
American leadership is centrally concerned with minimizing the risk of American 
military losses and managing costs, while the US still operates in a global context of 
power projection capability and national security interests. Obama’s America clearly 
has not undertaken a fundamental shift towards either a vision of cooperative security, 
or even isolationism.  
 
The original non-intervention on Syria has also illustrated that the identity of America 
as an exceptional leader in world politics and policies that counteract this identity 
cannot be bridged indefinitely within the existing paradigm of geopolitical identity. This 
conflict between the hegemonic imagination of American leadership and the practice of 
cooperative engagement and military restraint under Obama raises the question about 
the limits of reframing American exceptionalism, and the potential future breaking point 
of the existing hegemony discourse. The real question then seems to be, not if the 
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United States embraces an exemplary or missionary exceptionalism, but if the 
president’s geopolitical vision of American leadership can match the future expectations 
about American exceptionalism, both at home and abroad.  
 
President Obama uses the image of American exceptionalism and hegemony to advance 
policies actually designed to lessen the burden of American leadership, thus inverting 
the conventional linkage of exceptionalist rhetoric and hegemonic practices expressed 
through foreign interventionism and the use of military force. Discounting its 
Republican critics, this approach of ‘leading from behind’ and Obama’s vision of 
cooperative engagement have found tacit popular support. Yet, Obama’s vision also 
contains a fundamental, unresolved conflict between the idea of American uniqueness 
and global responsibility and a policy course that stresses the limits rather than the 
strengths of American power and engagement. Instead of formulating American 
exceptionalism as a geopolitical vision of global unipolar primacy, Obama employs the 
concept to reassure Americans of their country’s continued greatness and importance, 
while he at the same time attempts to bring American leadership closer in line with an 
increasingly multipolar world order. This is the peculiar and paradoxical character of 
post-American exceptionalism under president Obama. 
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